Grécia: negociações com a zona euro retomaram

Depois de muita pressão política, nomeadamente do grupo socialista no Parlamento Europeu, as negociações entre a zona euro e a Grécia retomaram esta tarde. Está neste momento em curso uma teleconferência entre os ministros das finanças do euro (eurogrupo) para tentar construir um acordo sobre o programa de assistência financeira à Grécia. Que posição vai assumir a ministra portuguesa das finanças?


LUSA:
Grécia: Maria João Rodrigues insta Passos Coelho a estar "à altura das circunstâncias”
A eurodeputada Maria João Rodrigues, vice-presidente dos Socialistas Europeus, apelou hoje ao primeiro-ministro, Pedro Passos Coelho, para que “esteja à altura das circunstâncias” e “trabalhe para uma solução” para a Grécia.

Em declarações à Lusa depois de participar numa conferência de imprensa dos Socialistas Europeus no Parlamento Europeu em Bruxelas, para instar todas as partes a voltar às negociações com vista a um acordo de “última hora”, a deputada defendeu que é necessária uma cimeira da zona euro, ao nível de chefes de Estado e de Governo, e um papel mais construtivo por parte de Portugal.

“Eu venho aqui fazer um apelo” para que Passos Coelho “esteja à altura das circunstâncias, que trabalhe para a solução, e a solução pode ter que vir hoje”, salientou.

Segundo Maria João Rodrigues, “Portugal não pode estar representado nestas instâncias por quem, como tem sido até agora, tem dificultado que se chegue a acordo, e por quem muitas vezes diz que este assunto é meramente para ministros das Finanças. Não, já não é. Este é um assunto da maior importância para a integridade da zona euro e para a confiança que os cidadãos europeus têm de ter no que é o projeto europeu”, declarou.

Apontando que existe ainda “uma hipótese, ainda frágil, de se chegar a acordo para que a Grécia possa fazer face ao risco financeiro muito grande e crescente em que está a incorrer e para que a população grega possa votar «sim» no domingo, com mais confiança em poder dispor de um programa que realmente relance o crescimento económico e o reequilíbrio social na Grécia”, a vice-presidente dos Socialistas Europeus defendeu que um compromisso “já não dos ministros das Finanças, mas sobretudo dos primeiros-ministros”, no formato de uma cimeira da zona euro.

“Os dois pontos críticos agora em discussão para fechar esse acordo são evitar que os complementos de reforma para os idosos mais pobres sejam cortados, porque isso seria dramático reduzindo a rede de segurança para muitas famílias na Grécia, e acordar instrumentos de maior porte para tornar a dívida grega, que é muito elevada, mais sustentável”, resumiu.

PRESS RELEASE Brussels, 27 June 2015

“Heads of State and Government must take the lead and find a solution before the end of the week”, say S&D Euro MPs

S&D Euro MPs urge EU heads of state and government to convene an extraordinary meeting after the negotiations on Greece broke off today at the Eurogroup. S&D Group leader Gianni Pittella stated: “The Eurozone is now entering troubled waters following the rejection of the Greek bailout extension. All efforts must be done to prevent a Grexit. The elements for a decent compromise remain on the table. The differences between the creditors’ proposals and the Greek government can be bridged if everyone is ready to make an effort.  The heads of state and government should now take the lead and find a solution before the end of the week. The European Commission also has now a crucial role to play as a facilitator. It is not the time to further punish the Greek people. Everything must be done to keep the financial flows inside the country.  Confronted with an unprecedented situation, Greek people must be offered the chance to choose their future. We are not afraid of any referendum.”   S&D Group vice president Maria João Rodrigues added:  ”We need to come up urgently with a credible and socially sensible solution to resolve this crisis and prevent the unthinkable. European citizens cannot understand European leaders' inability to find a compromise deal after five months of negotiations. A massive financial, economic, social and political disaster is looming if Greece is cut off from financial flows and pushed out of the Eurozone. The knock-on effects may also get out of control. It is incredible that at this late stage, national leaders would take ever-greater risks and only refer the matter back to the Eurogroup. The Greek crisis is also a top geopolitical issue for Europe: Greece is a vulnerable border country, highly exposed to acute pressures from Russia, the war in Syria and Iraq and the refugee crisis. Those who treat the current standoff purely as a financial crisis are playing with fire next to a barrel of gunpowder. For all these reasons, responsibility for finding the solution to the Greek case must be taken at the European institutions' highest level, i.e. by the Heads of State and Government.”

http://us7.campaign-archive2.com/?u=9e180a6b42ef1eae663a9e517&id=35c34a1675&e=978206eb21

Grécia: propostas do Governo segundo o ministro das finanças, Yanis Varoufakis

Texto publicado a 18 de Junho pelo ministro grego das finanças, Yanis Varoufakis, no seu blog http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/author/yanisv/ - Vale a pena ler

Greece’s Proposals to End the Crisis: My intervention at today’s Eurogroup

Posted on June 18, 2015 by yanisv

 The only antidote to propaganda and malicious ‘leaks’ is transparency. After so much disinformation on my presentation at the Eurogroup of the Greek government’s position, the only response is to post the precise words uttered within. Read them and judge for yourselves whether the Greek government’s proposals constitute a basis for agreement.

Colleagues,

Five months ago, in my very first Eurogroup intervention, I put it to you that the new Greek government faced a dual task:

We had to earn a precious currency without depleting an important capital good.

The precious currency we had to earn was a sense of trust, here, amongst our European partners and within the institutions. To mint that precious currency would necessitate a meaningful reform package and a credible fiscal consolidation plan.

As for the important capital we could not afford to deplete, that was the trust of the Greek people who would have to swing behind any agreed reform program that will end the Greek crisis. The prerequisite for that capital not to be depleted was, and remains, one: tangible hope that the agreement we bring back with us to Athens:

§  is the last to be hammered out under conditions of crisis;

§  comprises a reform package which ends the 6-year-long uninterrupted recession;

§  does not hit the poor savagely like the previous reforms did;

§  renders our debt sustainable thus creating genuine prospects of Greece’s return to the money markets, ending our undignified reliance on our partners to repay the loans we have received from them.

Five months have gone by, the end of the road is nigh, but this finely balancing act has failed to materialise. Yes, at the Brussels Group we have come close. How close? On the fiscal side the positions are truly close, especially for 2015. For 2016 the remaining gap amounts to 0.5% of GDP. We have proposed parametric measures of 2% versus the 2.5% that the institutions insist upon. This 0.5% gap we propose to bridge over by administrative measures. It would be, I submit to you, a major error to allow such a minuscule difference to cause massive damage to the Eurozone’s integrity. Convergence had also been achieved on a wide range of issues.

Nevertheless, I will not deny that our proposals have not instilled in you the trust that you need. And, at the same time, the institutions’ proposals that Mr Juncker conveyed to PM Tsipras cannot engender the hope that our citizens need. Thus, we have come close to an impasse.

At this, the 11^th hour, stage of the negotiations, before uncontrollable events take over, we have a moral duty, let alone a political and an economic one, to overcome this impasse. This is no time for recriminations and accusations. European citizens will hold collectively responsible all those of us who failed to strike a viable solution.

Even if some, misguided by rumours that a Greek exit may not be so terrible or that it may even benefit the rest of the Eurozone, are resigned to such an event, it is an event that will unleash destructive powers no one can tame. Citizens from all over Europe will target not the institutions but their elected finance ministers, their Prime Ministers and Presidents. After all, they elected us to promote Europe’s shared prosperity and to avoid pitfalls that may harm Europe.

Our political mandate is to find an honourable, workable compromise. Is it so difficult to do so? We do not think so. A few days ago Olivier Blanchard, the IMF’s Chief Economist published a piece entitled ‘Greece: A Credible Deal Will Require Difficult Decisions by All Sides.’ He is right, the three operative words being ‘by all sides’. Dr Blanchard added that: “At the core of the negotiations is a simple question. How much of an adjustment has to be made by Greece, how much has to be made by its official creditors?”

That Greece needs to adjust there is no doubt. The question, however, is not how much adjustment Greece needs to make. It is, rather, what kind of adjustment. If by ‘adjustment’ we mean fiscal consolidation, wage and pension cuts, and tax rate increases, it is clear we have done more of that than any other country in peacetime.

§  The public sector’s structural, or cyclically adjusted, fiscal deficit turned into a surplus on the back of a ‘world record beating’ 20% adjustment

§  Wages fell by 37%

§  Pensions were reduced by up to 48%

§  State employment diminished by 30%

§  Consumer spending was curtailed by 33%

§  Even the nation’s chronic current account deficit dropped by 16%.

No one can say that Greece has not adjusted to its new, post-2008, circumstances. But what we can say is that gigantic adjustment, whether necessary or not, has produced more problems than it solved:

§  Aggregate real GDP fell by 27% while nominal GDP continued to fall quarter-in-quarter-out for 18 quarters non-stop to this day

§  Unemployment skyrocketed to 27%

§  Undeclared labour reached 34%

§  Banks are labouring under non-performing loans that exceed 40% in value

§  Public debt has exceeded 180% of GDP

§  Young well-qualified people are abandoning Greece in droves

§  Poverty, hunger and energy deprivation have registered increases usually associated with a state at war

§  Investment in productive capacity has evaporated.

So, the first part of Dr Blanchard’s question “how much of an adjustment has to be made by Greece?” needs to be answered: Greece needs a great deal of adjustment. But not of the same kind that we have had in the past. We need more reforms not more cutbacks. For instance,

§  We need to adjust to a new culture of paying taxes, not to higher VAT rates that strengthen the incentive to cheat and drive law-abiding citizens into greater poverty

§  We need to make the pension system sustainable by eradicating unpaid labour, minimising early retirements, eliminating pension fund fraud, boosting employment – not by eradicating the solidarity tranche from the lowest of the low of pensions, as the institutions have demanded, thus pushing the poorest of the poor into greater poverty and conjuring up massive popular hostility against another set of so called reforms

In our proposals to the institutions we have offered:

§  An extensive (but optimised) privatisation agenda spanning the period 2015-2025

§  The creation of a fully independent Tax and Customs Authority (under the aegis and supervision of Parliament)

§  A Fiscal Council that oversees the state budget

§  A short-term program for limiting foreclosures and managing non-performing loans

§  Judicial and civil procedure code reforms

§  Liberalising several product markets and services (with protections for middle class values and professions that are part and parcel of society’s fabric)

§  Elimination of many nuisance charges

§  Public administration reforms (introducing proper staff evaluation systems, reducing non-wage costs, modernising and unifying public sector payrolls).

In addition to these reforms the Greek Authorities have engaged the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to help Athens design, implement and monitor a second series of reforms. Yesterday I met with the OECD’s Secretary General Mr Angel Gurria and his team to announce this joint reform agenda, complete with a specific roadmap:

§  A major Anti-corruption Drive and relevant institutions to support it – especially in the area of procurement

§  Liberalising the construction sector, including the market and standards of construction materials

§  Wholesale trade liberalisation

§  Media – electronic and press code of practice

§  One-Stop Business Centres that eradicate the bureaucratic impediments to doing business in Greece

§  Pension System Reform – where the emphasis is on a proper, long-term, actuarial study, the phasing out of early retirements, the reduction in the operating costs of the pensions funds, pension fund consolidation – rather than mere pension cuts.

Yes, colleagues, Greeks need to adjust further. We desperately need deep reforms. But, I urge you to take seriously under consideration this important difference between:

§  reforms that attack parasitic, rent-seeking behaviour or inefficiencies, and

§  parametric changes that jack up tax rates and reduce benefits to the weakest.

We need a lot more of the real reforms and a lot less of the parametric type.

Much has been said and written about our ‘backtracking’ on labour market reform and our determination to re-introduce protection for waged workers through collective bargaining agreements. Is this some left-wing fixation of ours that jeopardises efficiency? No, colleagues, it is not. Take for example the plight of young workers in several chain stores who get fired as they approach their 24^th birthday so that the employer hires younger workers in their place to avoid paying them the normal minimum wage which is lower for employees under the age of 24. Or take the case of employees who are hired part time for 300 euros a month, made to work full time and threatened with dismissal if they complain. Without collective bargaining, these abuses abound with ill effects on competition (as decent employers compete at a disadvantage with unscrupulous ones) but also with ill effects on pension funds and public revenues. Does anyone seriously think that the introduction of well-thought out collective bargaining, in collaboration with the ILO and the OECD, constitutes ‘reform reversal’, an example of ‘backtracking’?

Turning briefly to pensions again, much has been made of the fact that pensions account for more than they did in the past; as much as 16% of GDP. But consider this: Pensions have shrunk by 40% and the number of pensioners is stable. So, expenditure on pensions has fallen, not risen. That 16% of GDP is due not to spending more on pensions but, instead, to the dramatic drop in GDP which brought with it a similarly dramatic reduction in contributions due to the fall in employment and the rise of undeclared labour.

Our alleged backtracking on ‘pension reforms’ is that we have suspended the further reduction in pensions that have already lost 40% of their value when the prices of the goods and services that pensioners need, e.g. pharmaceuticals, have hardly moved. Consider this relatively unknown fact: Around 1 million families survive today on the meagre pension of a grandfather or a grandmother as the rest of the family members are unemployed in a country where only 9% of the unemployed receive any unemployment benefit. Cutting that one, solitary pension is tantamount to turning a family into the streets.

This is why we keep telling the institutions that, yes, we need pension reform but, no, you cannot just lob off 1% of GDP from pensions without causing massive, fresh misery and a fresh recessionary round as this 1.8 billion multiplied by a large fiscal multiplier (up to 1.5) is withdrawn from the circular flow of income. If large pensions still existed, whose curtailment would make a fiscal difference, we would do it. But the distribution of pensions is so compressed that savings of such a magnitude would have to eat into the pensions of the poorest. It is for this reason, I suppose, that the institutions are asking us to eliminate the solidarity pensions supplement to the poorest of the poor. And it is for this reason that we counter-propose proper reforms: a drastic reduction, almost elimination, of early retirements, consolidation of pension funds and interventions in the labour market that reduce undeclared labour.

Structural reforms promote growth potential. But mere cutbacks in an economy like Greece’s promote recession. Greece must adjust by introducing genuine reforms. But at the same time, going back to Dr Blanchard’s answer, the institutions need to adjust their definition of growth-enhancing reforms – to acknowledge that parametric cuts and tax hikes are not reforms and that, at least in the case of Greece, they have undermined growth.

Colleagues have remarked in the past, and may do so again, that our pensions are too high compared to their older people and that it is unacceptable for the Greek government to expect them to foot our pension bill. Let me be clear on this: We are never going to ask you to subsidise our state, our wages, our pensions, our public expenditure. The Greek state lives within its means. Over the past five months we have even managed, despite zero market access and zero disbursements, to repay our creditors. We intend to keep doing so.

I understand that there are concerns that our government may slip into a primary deficit again and that this is the reason the institutions are pressing us to accept large VAT rises and large pension cuts. While it is our view that the announcement of a viable agreement will suffice to boost economic activity sufficiently to produce a healthy primary surplus, I understand perfectly well that our creditors and partners may have cause to be sceptical to want safeguards; an insurance policy against our government’s possible slide into profligacy. This is what lies behind Dr Blanchard’s call for the Greek government to offer “truly credible measures.” So here comes an idea. A “truly credible measure”.

Instead of arguing over half a percentage point of measures (or on whether these tax measures will have to all of the parametric type or not), how about a deeper, more comprehensive, permanent reform? An automated hard deficit brake that is legislated and monitored by the independent Fiscal Council we and the institutions have already agreed upon. The Fiscal Council would monitor the state budget’s execution on a weekly basis, issue warnings if a minimum primary surplus target looks like being violated and, at some point, trigger automated across the board, horizontal, reductions in all outlays in order to prevent the slide below the pre-agreed threshold. That way a failsafe system is in place that ensures the solvency of the Greek state while the Greek government retains the policy space it needs in order to remain sovereign and able to govern within a democratic context. Consider this to be a firm proposal that our government will implement immediately after an agreement.

Given that our government will never again need to borrow from your taxpayers or from the taxpayers standing behind the IMF, there is no sense in a debate between member-states that compete on whose pensioners are poorer, instigating a race-to-the-bottom. Instead, the debate moves on to debt repayments. How large should our primary surpluses be? Does anyone seriously believe that the growth rate is independent of the primary target set? The IMF understands fully that the two numbers are linked endogenously and that this is the reason why Greece’s public debt must be looked at at once.

Our large debt overhang should be thought of as a large unfunded tax liability. While it is true that the EFSF and GLF slices of our debt are long-dated and the interest rate is not large, the Greek state’s unfunded tax liability, our debt, features a lumpy component that impedes investment and recovery today. I am referring here to the 27 billion of SMP bonds still held by the ECB. This is a short-dated unfunded liability that potential investors in Greece take a look at it and turn back because they can see the funding gap this part of the debt creates instantly and because they recognise that this lump of 27 billion on the ECB books stop Greece from taking advantage of the ECB’s quantitative easing at the very moment when this program is unfolding and is reaching its maximum capacity to come to the aid of countries buffeted by deflation. It is a cruel irony that the country most afflicted by deflation is the one that is excluded from the ECB’s anti-deflation remedy. And it is excluded because of this 27 billion lump.

Our proposal on this front is simple, efficient and mutually beneficial. We propose no new monies, not one fresh euro, for our state. Imagine the following three-part agreement to be announced in the next few days:

Part 1: Deep reforms, including the automated hard deficit brake that I mentioned.

Part 2: A rationalisation of Greece’s debt repayment schedule along the following lines. First, to effect an SMP BUY-BACK Greece acquires a new loan from the ESM, then purchases the SMP bonds back from the ECB and retires them. To underpin this loan, we agree that the deep reform agenda is the common conditionality for successfully completing the current program and for securing the new ESM arrangement that comes into operation immediately afterwards and runs concurrently with the continuing IMF program until the end of March 2016. Short-term funding relies on the outstanding disbursement from the current program and medium to long term funding is completed by the return of the SMP profits, coming up to 9 billion out of the 27 remaining billions, which go into an escrow account to be used in order to meet Greece’s repayments to the IMF.

Part 3: An investment program for kick-starting the Greek economy funded by the Juncker Plan, the European Investment Bank – with which we are in talks already – the EBRD and other partners who will be invited to participate also in conjunction with our privatization program and the establishment of a development bank that aims at developing, reforming and collateralizing public assets, including real estate.

Does anyone truly doubt that this three-part announcement would dramatically change the mood, inspire Greeks to work hard on hope of a better future, invite investors to a country whose asset prices have fallen so dramatically, and give confidence to Europeans that Europe can, even at the 11^th hour, do the right thing?

Colleagues, at this juncture it is dangerously easy to think that nothing can be done. Let us not fall prey to this state of mind. We can forge a good agreement. Our government is standing by, with ideas and with the determination to cultivate the two forms of trust necessary to end the Greek drama: Your trust in us and the trust of our people in Europe’s capacity to produce policies that work for, and not against, them.

 

James K. Galbraith - políticas de austeridade geraram uma catástrfe na Grécia

Vale a pena ler este artigo do economista americano James K. Galbraith, sobre a Grécia publicado no jornal Le Monde:

« Le FMI doit admettre que les politiques imposées à la Grèce ont généré une catastrophe »

Le Monde.fr  - 24 Juin 2015,

Pour l’économiste américain James K. Galbraith, les créanciers de la Grèce devraient écouter les propositions d’allègement de la dette plutôt que de chercher à refinancer des politiques inefficaces

L’économiste en chef du Fonds monétaire international (FMI), Olivier Blanchard, a soulevé une question simple: «Quelle doit être la mesure des ajustements auxquels il incombe à la Grèce de procéder, et quels doivent être les efforts fournis par ses créanciers publics?»

En mai 2010, le gouvernement grec a procédé à un ajustement budgétaire s’élevant à 16% de son produit intérieur brut (PIB) sur la période 2010-2013. La Grèce est ainsi passée d’un déficit budgétaire primaire (hors paiements d’intérêts de la dette) de plus de 10% du PIB à un solde primaire équilibré en2014. Dans le même temps, les «ajustements» ont consisté à réduire les dépenses publiques et le salaire minimum, à effectuer des privatisations au rabais, à supprimer les conventions collectives et à diminuer sévèrement les retraites.

Le FMI avait initialement prévu que le PIB réel de la Grèce (ajusté à l’inflation) subirait une contraction d’environ 5% sur la période 2010-2011, qu’il se stabiliserait en2012 et qu’il se remettrait ensuite à augmenter. En réalité, il a chuté de 25%, et n’a jamais pu remonter la pente. De plus, dans la mesure où le PIB nominal a diminué à partir de 2014, et continue de décliner, le ratio dette/PIB, censé se stabiliser en2012, continue d’augmenter.

Le FMI et les autres créanciers de la Grèce ont choisi de croire qu’une importante contraction budgétaire n’engendrerait qu’un effet temporaire sur l’activité économique, l’emploi et les impôts, et que les coupes effectuées sur les salaires, les retraites et les emplois publics auraient un effet magique sur la croissance. Cette hypothèse s’est révélée fausse. L’ajustement effectué par la Grèce a abouti à une véritable catastrophe économique –mettant en lumière les prévisions les plus erronées qu’ait jamais formulées le FMI.

Ainsi s’attendrait-on à ce que le FMI cesse de prolonger ce fiasco. Or, plutôt que d’admettre cette réalité et de s’y adapter, le FMI choisit de s’attaquer encore davantage aux retraites, en déclarant par la bouche de son économiste en chef, Olivier Blanchard: «Pourquoi insister sur les retraites? Avec les salaires, elles représentent environ 75% des dépenses primaires; les 25% restants ont d’ores et déjà été réduits à leur plus simple expression. Les retraites constituent plus de 16% du PIB, et les transferts du budget vers le système des retraites sont proches de 10% du PIB. Nous estimons qu’il faut réduire les dépenses de retraites de 1% du PIB (sur 16%), et qu’il est possible de le faire tout en protégeant les retraités les plus démunis.»

«Mesures crédibles» Mais, si le paiement des retraites représente aujourd’hui 16% du PIB grec, c’est précisément parce que l’économie de la Grèce se trouve contractée de 25% par rapport à 2009. Si ces six années d’austérité désastreuse n’avaient pas eu lieu, le PIB grec serait peut-être supérieur de 33% à ce qu’il est aujourd’hui, et les retraites ne représenteraient que 12% du PIB, au lieu des 16% actuels.

M.Blanchard appelle Athènes à proposer des «mesures véritablement crédibles». Mais le FMI ne devrait-il pas en faire de même? Pour diminuer les retraites d’un point de pourcentage du PIB, une croissance économique nominale de seulement 4% par an pendant deux ans se révélerait suffisante – sans coupes supplémentaires. Pourquoi ne pas proposer des «mesures crédibles» pour atteindre cet objectif-là?

Cela nous amène à la question de la dette grecque. Comme chacun le sait au FMI, l’existence d’un surendettement revient à dire qu’à tout moment vos investissements, vos bénéfices et votre travail acharné peuvent se retrouver taxés et dérobés afin de nourrir le cadavre de prêteurs passés. Le surendettement est donc un véritable barrage à la croissance. C’est la raison pour laquelle toutes les crises de la dette se terminent tôt ou tard en restructuration ou en défaut de paiement.

Olivier Blanchard est un pionnier de l’économie de la dette publique. Il sait pertinemment que la dette grecque n’a jamais été tenable à quelque période que ce soit au cours des six dernières années, pas plus qu’elle ne l’est aujourd’hui. C’est là un point sur lequel la Grèce et le FMI sont d’accord.

Il se trouve qu’Athènes formule une proposition crédible. Tout d’abord, laisser le Mécanisme européen de stabilité (MES) effectuer un prêt de 27milliards d’euros sur des échéances étendues, afin de retirer les obligations grecques que la Banque centrale européenne (BCE) a bêtement acquises en2010. Deuxièmement, consacrer les rendements de ces obligations au paiement du FMI. Enfin, faire participer la Grèce au programme d’assouplissement quantitatif de la BCE, ce qui permettrait au pays de faire son retour sur les marchés.

Les Grecs ont d’ores et déjà procédé à des choix difficiles. C’est désormais au FMI d’agir, en commençant par admettre que les politiques imposées pendant six ans ont généré une catastrophe. Les autres créanciers doivent admettre qu’il est nécessaire de restructurer les dettes grecques – comme le sait pertinemment le FMI.

Traduit de l’anglais par Martin Morel

James K. Galbraith est professeur à la Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs de l’université du Texas.

Flexibilidade do pacto de estabilidade e combate às práticas fiscais agressivas na UE: 3 intervenções na mesma tarde no plenário do PE

1. Revisão do quadro de governação económica: avaliação e desafios - Relatório  Pervenche Berès (A8-0190/2015)
 

Muito obrigada senhor presidente.

Senhor presidente, senhor comissário, caros colegas,

A Europa é o único grande bloco que, sete anos depois da crise de 2008, ainda não conseguiu sair dela.

Quando sair, será com cicatrizes profundas: o desemprego duplicou, os jovens qualificados das regiões menos competitivas emigraram, e o investimento baixou para mínimos históricos. As condições para crescermos juntos nunca foram tão difíceis.

Há que ter consciência de que, quanto maiores forem as divergências, menos viável será a moeda única.

É por isso que a opção da Comissão Juncker de finalmente aplicar a flexibilidade contida no Pacto de Estabilidade e Crescimento faz todo o sentido.

Acomodar nas regras o investimento estratégico e as reformas estruturais, e matizar essas regras de acordo com o ciclo económico, é uma questão de puro bom senso.

O relatório Berès toca alguns desses aspectos. Mas é importante relembrar aqui que a moeda única não sobreviverá:

• Se não fizermos uma revisão do conceito de reformas estruturais, passando a seleccionar aquelas que promovem uma verdadeira convergência de competitividade
• Se não criarmos direitos sociais mínimos a nível europeu.
• Se não estabilizarmos os mercados, cumprindo a promessa de criar uma garantia comum de depósitos até 100 mil euros na união bancária
• Se não colocarmos sob o método comunitário as troikas, o mecanismo europeu de estabilidade e o tratado orçamental;
• Se não encontrarmos uma solução comum para o problema das dívidas soberanas
• Se não criarmos um instrumento europeu capaz de relançar as economias em crise sem provocar uma recessão;
• Se não acabarmos com a prática em que os países roubam a matéria fiscal uns aos outros, enquanto ao mesmo tempo se sancionam quando os seus orçamentos não são equilibrados;

Há uma agenda em curso. O relatório Berès é apenas um passo, um passo importante, mas um passo.

Mas as reformas de fundo, que estão em parte cobertas no relatório dos 5 presidentes, têm de ser, em combinação com o relatório Berès, realizadas com a maior urgência se quisermos salvar verdadeiramente o projecto europeu.

Muito obrigada

2. Transparência na aplicação do Pacto de Estabilidade e Crescimento - Questão Oral à Comissão Europeia

 
 

Muito obrigada senhora presidente.

Senhora presidente, caros colegas,

A flexibilidade que a Comissão Europeia tem vindo a utilizar na aplicação do Pacto de Estabilidade e Crescimento não constitui, ao contrário do que muitos querem fazer crer, uma alteração dissimulada das regras de governação económica.

Pelo contrário: esta flexibilidade já está há muito inscrita nas regras, com a diferença de que a anterior Comissão, por razões ideológicas, penso, nunca a quis aplicar.

É por isso que os socialistas europeus apoiam plenamente esta decisão da Comissão que permite adaptar o Pacto às condições específicas de cada país, evitando as políticas pró-cíclicas que contribuíram e muito para o desastre económico e social na Europa nos últimos anos.

O relatório Berès, que acabámos de discutir e nos preparamos para votar, confirma essa maior transparência e clareza na aplicação das regras actuais, nomeadamente em termos de especificação e clarificação do âmbito da cláusula de investimento e na avaliação das reformas estruturais.

Neste contexto, e com um objectivo de aumentar a transparência, o grupo socialista gostaria que a Comissão clarificasse alguns pontos:

               1. Que metodologia utiliza a Comissão para avaliar, quando analisa a posição orçamental dos Estados membros, o "output gap", o saldo orçamental estrutural e o crescimento potencial estimado do PIB?

               2. Na aplicação do Pacto de Estabilidade, que metodologia utiliza a Comissão Europeia para calcular os custos e o valor acrescentado das reformas estruturais?

               3. Na aplicação também do Pacto de Estabilidade de que forma estima, calcula a Comissão Europeia o impacto das suas recomendações no processo de convergência entre Estados membros?

Agradeço estas respostas e muito obrigada senhora presidente.
 

 

3. Decisão adotada sobre o plano de ação para um sistema de tributação das empresas mais equitativo na UE - Declaração da Comissão

 

Muito obrigada senhora presidente.
Senhora comissária,

Este novo pacote de transparência fiscal apresentado pela Comissão Europeia é bem-vindo. É mais um passo ainda insuficiente, mas na direcção certa, em resposta ao escândalo dos LuxLeaks.

De facto, não é aceitável que alguns países que controlam violentamente os orçamentos de outros, impondo-lhes cortes de despesa brutais, sejam os mesmos que, todos os dias, lhes roubam as receitas fiscais através de práticas agressivas e desleais.

Esta situação é injusta e é politicamente insustentável!

O Grupo Socialista pede, há anos, a instituição da (em inglês) CCCTB - isto é, de uma base comum para o cálculo da matéria coletável consolidada e obrigatória para todas as empresas da União. Sem esta base comum, não se pode comparar taxas de imposto. Lamentamos que o C da "consolidação" tenha ficado, por agora, aparentemente fora das propostas - porque, sem certezas sobre os preços de transferência, o combate à erosão das bases fiscais fica fragilizado.

Também lamentamos que a obrigação de reporte, país a país, das contas das empresas - o chamado Country By Country Reporting - seja adiada à espera de um estudo de viabilidade que não era de todo necessário.

Uma questão que coloco: o que podemos nós fazer enquanto representantes de cidadãos esmagados por cargas brutais de impostos, para que a Europa avance mais rapidamente numa agenda de justiça fiscal em que a concorrência se faça entre empresas e não entre Estados.

Eu cumprimento a Comissão por esta proposta, pelo trabalho que está a realizar. Mas pode assegurar-nos, cara comissária Marianne Thyssen, que na sequência do compromisso político de Juncker, todo o Colégio de comissários e não apenas alguns comissários, estará unido numa posição convergente, coerente e ambiciosa, capaz de, com o Parlamento, fazer mover o Conselho de Ministros - habitualmente bloqueado pela regra da unanimidade?

No que diz respeito à Comissão TAXE, posso assegurar-lhe que o espírito que nos une é de compromisso, exigência e cooperação leal com uma agenda ambiciosa da Comissão em matéria fiscal. Os cidadãos pedem-nos isso. Muito obrigada.